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FACULTY-STUDENT CONTRIBUTION
BANKRUPTCY
James W. Bowers* and David H. Hardy**
Matters of bankruptcy concern occurred in three principal areas dur-
ing the past year. First, the bankruptcy court system and Congress con-
tinued to struggle with the problems created when the United States
Supreme Court ruled that much of the jurisdictional basis for the current
system was unconstitutional. Second, the Louisiana Legislature changed
the treatment some Louisiana lenders can expect in bankruptcy by pass-
ing the new Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act. Finally, the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Louisiana appellate courts
addressed the complications that result when bankruptcy law requires that
the debtor's affairs be severed from those of his co-debtors and of the
coowners of the property chargeable with his debts.
JURISDICTION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 granted to the federal district
courts jurisdiction over all bankruptcy proceedings' and then decreed that
the granted power would be exercised not by the district courts themselves,
but rather by the bankruptcy courts.2 In June 1982, the United States
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.3 held that the bankruptcy court's exercise of this jurisdiction
over certain disputed matters violated article III of the United States Con-
stitution. Article III requires that the judicial power of the United'States
be exercised by judges with life tenure who face no prospect of having
their salaries diminished while in office.' The bankruptcy judges, with
limited tenure' and potentially adjustable salaries,' do not meet those ar-
ticle III qualifications. However, the Supreme Court expressly stayed en-
try of its mandate until October 4, 1982, in order to permit Congress
to amend the Act and repair the deficiency.' Upon request of the United
States Solicitor General, the Court further extended the stay until December
24, 1982.8 A third request for an additional three-month stay was subse-
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (Supp. V 1981).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. V 1981).
3. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. V 1981).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1981). Salaries of bankruptcy judges are "subject to
adjustment under section 225 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967, (2 U.S.C. 351-361), and
section 461 of this title." Id.
7. 458 U.S. at 88.
8. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982).
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quently denied,9 leaving the bankruptcy system in a constitutional limbo.
In the meantime, another crisis looms next spring when, on March 31,
1984, the terms of office of all the existing bankruptcy judges expire."
To plug the gap, the district courts have adopted a so-called
"temporary-emergency rule" drafted by the Judicial Conference of the
United States.'' Under the rule, the district courts, staffed with true arti-
cle III judges, purport to take back jurisdiction from the bankruptcy
courts. The district courts then redelegate part of their power to the
bankruptcy judges, using procedures which preserve the right of claimants
and other parties to the bankruptcy to have certain issues (presumably
those required by article III) reviewed or tried in district court. 2 The basic
business of the bankruptcy courts operating under the temporary emergency
rule has been conducted very much as it was before the Marathon deci-
sion became effective. No one, however, is comfortable with the tem-
porary solution.' 3 It is not entirely clear, for example, that the district
courts had the authority to adopt the temporary rule. For one thing, it
may violate the command in the Bankruptcy Act that bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion be exercised by the bankruptcy courts. '4 Even though the command
is unconstitutional, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended
to empower the district courts to act as backstops when the primary scheme
fell. Additionally, even if Congress had authorized the temporary solu-
tion, no one is sure that courts can accomplish by rule what Congress
could not constitutionally accomplish in the statute."' Until Congress acts,
or the rule survives all the possible challenges, the orders and judgments
which emerge from the bankruptcy process will be subject to question.
9. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 103 S. Ct. 662 (1982).
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 404(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2683
(1978).
11. See S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
12. The Judicial Conference Rule is reported in full in D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE 1214-17 (Interim ed. 1983). It was adopted by the Middle District of Loui-
siana on December 22, 1982. M.D. LA. R. 29.
13. See, e.g., Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds
Legislative Courts, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 207 (1983); King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy
Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1983);
Levit & Mason, Where Do We Go From Here? Bankruptcy Administration Post-Marathon,
87 CoM. L.J. 353 (1982); Vihon, Delegation of Authority and the Model Rule: The Contin-
uing Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 CoM. L.J. 64 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 9, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1983).
14. The source of rule-making authority in the district courts is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071, which states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall
be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court." It remains to be seen whether the rule which places jurisdiction back
into the district courts is "consistent" with the Act's requirement that the power be reposed
in the bankruptcy court.
15. See Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983); see, e.g., King, supra note 13.
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Meanwhile, both houses of Congress have been working on more per-
manent repairs to the bankruptcy system. The 1978 Act was the result
of a ten-year effort involving a great number of political compromises.'
6
In fact, the now invalid jurisdictional provisions of the statute were the
result of a House-Senate conference committee report resolving the con-
flict between the preferences of the House that bankruptcy judges be given
true article III rank, and those of the Senate that bankruptcy judges be
given more limited status." The Senate has passed and referred to the
House a repair measure entitled The Bankruptcy Court and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1983, which continues the fourteen-year term of ap-
pointment for bankruptcy judges,' 8 leaves their salaries potentially
adjustable 9 and continues the provisions of the present Act which em-
power the judicial conference to remove them from office for incom-
petency, misconduct, or disability." The bill, like the current Act, pro-
vides that all bankruptcy matters be automatically referred to bankruptcy
judges. 2' The new scheme attempts to clear the Marathon hurdle by
specifically authorizing the article III judges of the district court to exer-
cise bankruptcy jurisdiction. The bill requires that certain matters be
"recalled" from the bankruptcy court and heard in district court. Such
recalls are mandatory under the bill when the Constitution requires that
the issues involved be tried before an article III judge.22 Parties may, under
the bill's terms, consent to have their disputes tried in bankruptcy court
instead of on recall.23 The bill further authorizes the district judge to refer
recalled matters back to the bankruptcy judges, who will thereafter func-
tion as special masters or magistrates.2 ' The House is considering revert-
ing to its initial position. A bill styled the Bankruptcy Court Act of 1983,
which upgrades the status of bankruptcy judges to the article III level,
has passed the House Judiciary Committee and is currently pending before
the full House.25
Once one of the original political trade-offs becomes unwound, it
would not be surprising if some of the other issues compromised in 1978
also are reopened. On the same day that the Senate passed the bill deal-
16. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV.
941 (1979).
17. See Conley, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Bankruptcy, 43 LA. L. REV.
327, 328-29 (1982).
18. S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1983).
19. S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 50 (1983); see supra note 6.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. V 1981).
21. S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1983).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Some doubt over the validity of such referrals back to bankruptcy judges may
arise as a result of Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d
1305 (9th Cir. 1983) (held that the Federal Magistrate Act is unconstitutional because it
also delegates judicial power to non-article IIl judges).
25. See H.R. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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ing with the Marathon problem, it passed a companion measure styled
the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983.26 The provisions of
that bill attempt to significantly improve the rights of creditors, particularly
consumer creditors, over the comparable rights given in the 1978 reform
act. The bill, if finally enacted by both houses of Congress, would also
make significant changes in the bankruptcy treatment of grain elevator
failures, shopping center leases, timber contracts, and other matters which,
in the Senate's view, have been troublesome under the 1978 Act." It is
too early to predict the extent to which such proposals for change will
become linked to the political compromises necessary to resolve the fun-
damental constitutional defects in the 1978 Act. It does seem reasonable
to assume, however, that some significant changes in the Act itself will
accompany any Congressional solution to the current constitutional crisis.
BANKRUPTCY CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW ASSIGNMENT OF
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ACT
Debtors suffering financial difficulties generally exhaust their assets
prior to filing for bankruptcy. During the downhill slide, aggressive
creditors get partial or full payments. In efforts to raise funds, debtors
sell or encumber their assets. Frequently part or all of the debtor's prop-
erty is seized to satisfy judgments. When bankruptcy occurs, there is lit-
tle, if any, residue with which to pay the remaining unsecured creditors,
unless some of the eleventh hour payments can be brought back into the
bankrupt's estate, or unless some of the encumbrances can be avoided.28
Consequently, the real "action" in a bankruptcy proceeding usually in-
volves attempts by the bankruptcy trustee to recover prebankruptcy
payments and other transfers made to creditors which were either
fraudulent or preferential, or to invalidate the security devices obtained
by secured creditors.
Creditors taking assignments of accounts receivable as collateral for
their loans have been vulnerable to such actions by bankruptcy trustees
for a rather complicated set of reasons. At its latest session, the Loui-
siana Legislature revised the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act.29
One of the effects of the revisions is to decrease the vulnerablity of such
lenders to bankruptcy losses.
26. See S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 129 CONG. REC. S5388 (daily ed. Apr.
27, 1983).
27. See S.445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
28. Under the old act 85% of all bankruptcies yielded no dividends to unsecured creditors.
The 15% which did pay yielded an average of five cents on the dollar to holders of unsecured
claims. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS, tables F-4a, -6 (1978); Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1452, 1453 (1964).
29. 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 9:3101-:31.11 (1983).
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The Typical Accounts Receivable Financing Deal
Merchants, professionals, and other businessmen typically find that
selling on credit is advantageous. Credit sales, however, require additional
capital because the businessman must pay for his inventory, labor, rent,
overhead, and other expenses connected with his sales before he receives
from his clients and customers the revenues those sales generate. Fre-
quently, banks or other lenders are willing to supply this additional re-
quired working capital, taking security interests in the promises of the
borrower's customers to pay for the goods or services they have received.
Since it is often possible for the borrower to collect the accounts more
efficiently than the lender (for, among other reasons, the borrower often
maintains continuing business relationships with his credit customers), such
loan agreements may contemplate that the customers (account debtors)
will pay the borrower directly. The customers may never even be aware
that their accounts have been assigned to a lender. At intervals, the bor-
rower will remit the amounts collected from his customers to the lender
to retire the loan. Since the need for capital to finance the credit sales
is. a continuing one, however, many such loan arrangements contemplate
that the borrower may use the collections to purchase new inventory or
to finance new sales which will generate new accounts from the customers;
these new accounts will continue to be subject to the lender's security
interest.
Prior to 1980, the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act
probably did not permit businesses to assign "future" accounts.3 0 The
Act was amended in 1980 to permit assignments of future accounts, thereby
permitting Louisiana banks and borrowers to enter into financing ar-
rangements of the sort described above.3 Nevertheless, lenders taking
assignments of accounts receivable as security for working capital loans
under the 1980 law were vulnerable when their borrowers went into
bankruptcy. Serious weaknesses in their position resulted from the so-
called "strong-arm" provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
and the provisions for avoidance of so-called preferential transfers. The
new Act strengthens the lender's position in both cases.
Defeating the Strong-Arm
The first effect of the bankruptcy scheme is to freeze all rights of
all creditors as of a specific date. The freeze happens primarily through
the operation of section 54432 of the Act, the so-called "strong-arm"
30. See Air Compressors, Inc. v. Big Chief Constr. Co., 367 So. 2d 413, 414 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 465 (La. 1979) (overruled on other grounds
by Agrico Chemical Co. v. E.K. Painting, Inc., 432 So. 2d 253, 255 (La. 1983)).'
31. See LA. R.S. 9:3101(9), added by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982).
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clause.33 The date of the freeze is the date of the commencement of the
case, which occurs when either a voluntary or involuntary petition is filed.34
As of that date, section 544, the strong-arm clause, gave the bankruptcy
trustee" "The rights and powers of . . . a creditor . . . that obtains,
at such time . . . a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on
a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether or not such
a creditor exists."
The strong-arm clause affected the typical accounts receivable financ-
ing arrangement under the former law in several ways. For instance:
(1) The old accounts receivable law gave the holders of perfected
assignments a priority over garnishing creditors on the accounts
themselves-but only on the accounts.36 The secured lender, therefore,
still prevailed over the bankruptcy trustee exercising the strong-arm powers
(which were those of a garnishing creditor) on the accounts themselves.37
(2) At any arbitrary point in time, however, such as the commence-
ment of bankruptcy, much of the capital advanced in the typical financ-
ing arrangement is not tied up in unpaid accounts themselves. Significant
portions are represented by funds "in the pipeline" which started when
the customer pays the account. Once the customer's check to the bor-
rower is dispatched, the account disappears. 8 The lender, however, has
no security interest in the check. The strong-arm clause treats the trustee
as a creditor who levies on the check, a position which defeats the lender
33. The strong arm clause was the name given to section 70(c) of the old bankruptcy
act from which section 544 of the new act is derived. The effect of the freeze is further
strengthened by section 362(a) of the new act which provides that the filing of a petition
operates as an automatic stay of all attempts to collect debts against the debtor or his property.
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1982).
35. The debtor himself, if the petition was filed not for a liquidation under chapter
7 of the Act, but rather for a reorganization under chapter 11, is given the powers of
a trustee including the strong-arm power. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
36. Prior to 1980, the Louisiana Act defined accounts receivable, or account to mean
"any indebtedness or part thereof due to, arising out of, or acquired in connection with
any business, profession, occupation or undertaking of the assignor." See LA. R.S. 9:3101(1)
(as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1980 La. Acts, No. 360, § 1). The 1980 amend-
ment changed the definition to "any indebtedness . . . due to or arising out of the sale
of goods or the performance of services, or the leasing of movable or immovable prop-
erty." LA. R.S. 9:3101(1) (1983) (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1983 La. Acts,
No. 319, § 1). The operative provision of the old act, both before and after the 1980 amend-
ments, was LA. R.S. 9:3102 which granted the lender rights in an "account receivable,"
as so defined.
37. LA. R.S. 9:3102 (1983) (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1983 La. Acts,
No. 319, § 1).
38. More precisely, the account is deemed conditionally paid until the check clears.
The account would then be deemed paid retroactively to the date the check was tendered.
See, e.g., Ivy v. American Road Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 549 (La. 1981); cf. U.C.C. § 3-802,
2 U.L.A. 601 (1977).
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who had no right to the check as part of his original collateral.39 Similarly,
once the businessman/borrower receives the check and deposits it, the
strong-armed trustee could take the deposit unless the borrower's bank
account is set up to form additional pledged collateral for the loan. Finally,
once the deposit is withdrawn to purchase new assets, the trustee can take
those assets (normally new inventory or equipment), unless they are then
covered by another security device (usually a chattel mortgage or an
assigned vendor's lien) to shield them from a levying creditor, or the
trustee, his statutory twin.
Lenders in the forty-nine other states, operating under the provisions
of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, were spared part of the
insecurity faced by their Louisiana counterparts, and also part of the ex-
pense of having to use multiple and cumbersome security devices such
as chattel mortgages and pledged bank accounts to maintain a priority
over a strong-armed trustee in funds in the pipeline. Article 9 gives secured
lenders taking accounts as collateral for their loans a pipeline priority over
the trustee by including the "proceeds" ' of the accounts as part of the
initial collateral (unless otherwise agreed between the lender and
businessman/borrower). The new Louisiana Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Act adopts the Article 9 formula.
Section 3107(A) of the new Act defines proceeds to include "whatever
is received upon the sale, exchange, collections or other disposition of
an account, or proceeds."'" Under section 3107(B), "the assignee's in-
terest in an account continues in any identifiable proceeds including col-
lections received by the assignor""2 (unless otherwise agreed, presumably
in the original loan agreement). Finally, section 3102(C) puts teeth into
the pipeline protection given to the secured lender by providing: "An
assignee under a valid Notice of Assignment shall have a superior claim
to the accounts assigned and their proceeds as against all other creditors
whose claims or security arose or are perfected after the filing of the Notice
of Assignment."" 3 That superiority over, for example, a garnishing or
levying Louisiana creditor, also turns out to be superiority over the strong-
armed trustee.
The new Act will not entirely eliminate the strong-arm vulnerability
of accounts receivable financing in Louisiana. The loan administration
process must still be set up to permit easy identification of funds and
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
40. See U.C.C. 9-306, 3 U.L.A. 436 (1977).
41. LA. R.S. 9:3107(A) (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1 (emphasis
added).
42. LA. R.S. 9:3107(B) (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, § 1.
43. LA. R.S. 9:3102(C) (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No., 319, § 1 (emphasis
added).
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assets in the pipeline as "proceeds" (the definition of which includes pro-
ceeds of proceeds). Under the old accounts receivable law, problems of
security device theory and technicality had to be overcome; for example,
it was necessary to determine whether the mortgage and pledge agreements
were adequate in execution and filing4  and whether a deposit account
to which the borrower has convenient access is truly delivered in pledge
to the lender. 5 The new Act reduces those problems to matters of simple
proof: are the customers' checks "proceeds"; are they the funds in the
bank account; was the new inventory purchased with those funds? To
the extent that it is easier, cheaper, and safer to answer the latter ques-
tions than it was to run the former multiple security device gauntlet, the
value of Louisiana accounts as collateral for loans should be enhanced.
Banks can now lend more or charge less for providing this safer, typi-
cally secured working capital financing than they could in the past. If the
costs to banks do decline, then the costs of borrowing businesses extend-
ing credit, and prices as well, should decline. The result will probably
be small gains to a large number of Louisiana consumers who buy on
credit. The expense, of course, will be borne in part by the unsecured
creditors in the bankruptcies of the few Louisiana businesses that do fail.
The Preference Problem
After strong-arm cases, the most widely litigated area of bankruptcy
law has been the preference problem. It is good bankruptcy policy to
inhibit random dismemberment by aggressive creditors of temporarily
distressed businesses. 6 Consequently, insolvency statutes frequently con-
tain provisions which permit the trustee to force creditors to return
payments they receive just prior to bankruptcy. 7 The payments recovered
are then ratably distributed among all creditors, eliminating the incentive
of any one of them to engage in aggressive tactics to obtain preferential
treatment. One of the advantages of having a security interest has always
been to avoid preference attacks by bankruptcy trustees. Insofar as
payments received by secured creditors release the collateral and make
it available as an asset for distribution to others, payments of secured
debt generally do not prefer the security holder. Nevertheless, having secur-
44. See, e.g., Air Compressors, Inc. v. Big Chief Constr. Co., 367 So. 2d 413 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 465 (La. 1979) (overruled by the new Assign-
ment of Accounts Receivable Act; Expos6 Des Motifs, 1983 La. Acts, No. 319).
45. See, Steadman v. Action Fin. Corp., 197 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused,
250 La. 907, 199 So. 2d 918 (1967).
46. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857, 861-62 (1982).
47. Cf. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3541(2) (specifies that a debtor's intent to grant an
"unfair preference" to one creditor is grounds for issuance of a writ of attachment to
his other creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
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ity does not automatically avoid the secured creditor's vulnerability to
preference attacks.
The preference provisions of the present bankruptcy act illustrate some
of the problems. Trustees may avoid transfers of the debtor's property,
to or for the benefit of a creditor,"' on account of an antecedent debt,49
made while the debtor was insolvent," ° and during a stated period prior
to bankruptcy," which enables the benefited creditor to receive more than
he would have received had the transfer not been made and the creditor
had received instead a ratable share of the debtor's assets in a chapter
7 bankruptcy liquidation." The Act then exempts certain transfers which
might otherwise technically be deemed preferential."
The preference provisions form some hidden traps for lenders taking
accounts receivable, for example, as security. Simply taking the security
interest, for example, is deemed a "transfer."' 4 Loan arrangements which
grant security interests in future accounts, which they typically do, ac-
tually contemplate that such transfers will happen automatically as each
new account comes into being (or is increased by future credit sales by
the borrower to his credit customers). Both the 1980 amendments and
the new Act validate such future transfers." Since the original loan was
advanced long before the security interest in the "future" accounts arises,
those automatic transfers are all on'account of antecedent debts and,
therefore, are almost automatically preferential if the accounts are created
during the ninety-day (or in some cases one year) preference-vulnerability
period. Accounts receivable, moreover, generally have limited lives. An
account over ninety days old is likely to be simply a bad debt. It follows
that the accounts which serve as collateral on the day of bankruptcy are
very likely to have been paid off and renewed during the ninety-day
preceding period. Thus, almost all of them will represent recent transfers
subject to a preference attack.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1982).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1982).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1982). The trustee is entitled to a presumption that the deb-
tor was insolvent for the 90 days immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tions. 11 U.S.C. § 547() (1982).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982).
53. II U.S.C. § 547(c) lists six such exemptions. For a recent case construing one of
them (11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)) exempting payments made in the ordinary course of business
within 45 days after the debt arose, see In re Emerald Oil Co., 695 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1983). The case holds that payments made within 45 days after the invoice is sent are not
necessarily made within 45 days after the debt arose, and, therefore, may be avoidable
preferences.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982).
55. LA. R.S. 9:3101(7) (1983) (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1983 La. Acts,
No. 319, § 1) (old act); LA. R.S. 9:3101(9) (1983), added by 1983 La. Acts, No. 319, §
I (new act).
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The Bankruptcy Act, however, gives a limited exemption from
preference attack to holders of security interests in accounts receivable.
The trustee may not avoid a transfer
of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all
such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date
of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt
secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all secur-
ity interest for such debt on the later of . . . . [The Act then
defines three possible initial test dates, the most common being
ninety days before the petition]. 6
In plain English, this rather tortured language means: (1) Measure the
extent to which the debt exceeded the value of the collateral (i.e., the
accounts) on the date the petition was filed; (2) compute that same defi-
ciency at a second date (usually ninety days but in some cases one year,
and in others less than ninety days, before the petition); and (3) subtract
your first number from the second one. The difference, but only the dif-
ference, is deemed a preferential transfer. In other words, lenders holding
assignments of accounts receivable as security will lose their priority over
the bankruptcy trustee only to the extent that their positions improved
during the statutory preference vulnerability period. Figure one illustrates
this situation.
Figure One
$100,000 Balance Outstanding on the Loan
90 -- 00 --- - --------------------------------- - Deficit
Value of the
Deficit Accounts I mprovement
in
Position
(voidable)
50,000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
MONEY
30,000
Time I
Preference Date of
Test Petition
Date
56. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982).
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Suppose that during the last ninety days prior to bankruptcy, the
outstanding balance of the secured loans is $100,000, but the value of
the collateral fluctuates from $50,000 at the test date to a low of $30,000
and then back to a high of $90,000 at the date of the petition. The crea-
tion of new accounts during the period has added $40,000 to the lender's
security. While the value of the collateral sank as low as $30,000 (which
means that over $60,000 of new accounts and potentially preferential
transfers were created during the vulnerability period), the trustee will take
only $40,000, since between the two test dates the lender's position im-
proved by only that much.
Note, however, the possible difference that the new Assignment of
Accounts Receivable Act can make. Figure two portrays that effect.
The facts illustrated here are identical to those just discussed, except
that the time line has been backed up to show what may have happened
prior to the initial test date. During the period prior to the measurement
date, $40,000 worth of the accounts was paid by the credit customers
of the bankrupt borrower. Under the new Act, however, those same
customer payments, which reduce the value of the outstanding accounts
receivable, can generate an equivalent amount of "proceeds" in the
pipeline. Thus, at the initial test date, the total collateral securing the
loans remains at the $90,000 level. The deficit is the same at the initial
test date as it is at the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. There has
been no improvement in the lender's position, and, consequently, none
of the value of the new accounts can be avoided by the trustee.
Figure Two
$100,000 Balance Outstanding on the Loan
I deficit " Deficit
90,000 -- .... --
Value
of
MOEY Proceeds
50,000 - -----------------------
Value
of
Accounts
I Time
Test Date of
Date Petition
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A principal feature of the Louisiana law of security devices has always
been its treatment of separate types of security devices under separate
statutory schemes." One weakness of that scheme for authorizing the tak-
ing of security is that it creates gaps between the various permitted security
devices. The lender must take expensive steps to protect himself when,
in the operation of the borrower's business, the collateral changes form,
thus necessitating the use of a different device for each new form. In
the gaps, the lender's position is jeopardized by the power granted to
bankruptcy trustees. The proceeds provisions of the new Act are a first
step in the process of coordinating the various Louisiana security devices
and eliminating the holes between them. Were proceeds also recognized
as integral parts of the collateral when chattels are mortgaged or other
assets pledged, Louisiana lenders would finally be burdened with no more
vulnerability in bankruptcy than are their counterparts in sister states.
THE WORK OF THE COURTS
Untangling the Affairs of Bankrupts
The twin goals of bankruptcy legislation are to collect and distribute
the debtor's assets to his creditors, and to discharge the debtor from those
debts which remain. Neither of those goals seems conceptually complex
until two possibilities arise: What happens when the debtor's "property"
is only partially owned by him and what happens when other people are
liable with him for his debt? Somehow, the bankruptcy process requires
that the debtor's affairs be untangled from those of his coowners and
his co-debtors. Problems of this type were confronted by the courts over
the last year.
Co-debtors
Wedgeworth v. Fireboard Corp. 8 is one of the many asbestosis ac-
tions currently being litigated in jurisdictions around the country. The
outcome of these actions became uncertain when the two principal defen-
dants, Johns-Manville Corp.(Johns-Manville) and UNR Industries, Inc.
(UNR), petitioned for chapter 11 reorganization. Following initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings, all actions against Johns-Manville and UNR were
automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The question then arose
whether the stay precluded continuation of the suits against co-defendants
of Johns-Manville and UNR. In this case, the Fifth Circuit consolidated
57. For example, chattels must be mortgaged under the chattel mortgage law. LA. R.S.
9:5351-:5366 (1983), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 304, § 1. Pledges are governed
by Civil Code articles 3133-3187. Vendors privileges fall under Civil Code articles 3227-3231.
58. 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983).
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appeals from the Western, Middle and Eastern Districts of Louisiana to
consider that problem.
In a well reasoned construction of the automatic stay provision of
the Bankruptcy Act, the court held that the protections of section 362
neither apply to codefendants nor preclude severance." As the court points
out, ample justification for the decision exists not only in the language
of the statute, which only stays judicial proceedings against the debtor,
but also in its purpose, which is to protect and prevent a run on the
debtor's assets. Referring to another provision of the Bankruptcy Act not
involved in this case, the court noted that Congress when it wants to can
unequivocally express its intent to stay actions against co-debtors (chapter
13's stay provision applies to actions against "any individual that is liable
on such debt with the debtor"). 61
The bankruptcy court below had issued discretionary stays in two of
the original cases consolidated on this appeal. The Fifth Circuit on review
held that considerations of the obvious hardship on plaintiffs, many of
them terminally ill, and the likely length of bankruptcy proceedings
outweighed the codefendants' claims of hardship. The court thus vacated
the stays, finding that the bankruptcy courts had abused their discretion.
Perhaps the most significant issue of the case arose from the denials
by the district court in one of the consolidated cases of plaintiffs' motion
for leave to amend their complaints to assert a direct action against the
liability insurers of Johns-Manville and UNR. The Fifth Circuit found
plaintiffs guilty of no undue delay in suing the insurers and also found
that defendants failed to prove that they would be unduly prejudiced by
amendment. Since plaintiffs were not in bad faith, the court declared leave
to amend to assert a direct action proper on authority of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:655. Although cognizant of the potential advantage to Loui-
siana residents in allowing direct action against the Johns-Manville and
UNR insurers, the court stated that "this advantage is the result of a
fair and constitutional implementation of 'Louisiana's legitimate interest
in safeguarding the rights of persons injured there.'61
The decision seems correct. Several authorities state that where the
state law allows for direct action against the insurer, the situation of the
bankrupt should not affect direct actions by the creditor against the
bankrupt's liability insurer.62 Although the potential advantage to Loui-
59. Id. at 544.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982).
61. 706 F.2d at 547 (quoting Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S.
66, 73 (1954)).
62. See Fix v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1967); D.
CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 367 (2d ed. 1978).
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siana residents is great, plaintiffs in other jurisdictions are not without
recourse. Those plaintiffs may have their unliquidated claims litigated in
the bankruptcy court or seek to have the stay lifted to the extent of the
insured's policy limits. 6
Co-debtors/Coo wners
In King v. Fidelity National Bank, 6" Fidelity filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition against both Mr. and Mrs. King, although the action
was presumably based on a separate debt of the husband. The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the Bankruptcy Act granted no authority to a creditor to,
in effect, put a coowner of its debtor's property into bankruptcy, and
dismissed the petition with respect to the wife.
Although the King decision may be considered an unremarkable
declaration of established law, it does raise an interesting question. Under
Louisiana law, property of the marital community is liable for the debts
of its members.6 5 The initiation of bankruptcy proceedings would result
in a stay of all proceedings against the bankrupt and the property of his
estate including community property.66 Should separate creditors of the
wife, for example, be unable as a matter of law to file their claims in
the husband's bankruptcy, the effect would be to give preference to one
spouse's separate creditors over the separate creditors of the other spouse
insofar as the community property is concerned. A close reading of the
Bankruptcy Act would avoid this result.
Only "creditors" may file claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. 6 The
question then arises whether the separate creditor of the nonbankrupt
spouse is also a creditor of the spouse in bankruptcy so as to be permit-
ted to file a claim and thus share in the value of the community prop-
erty. The term creditor is defined in the Bankruptcy Act to include an
"entity that has a community claim ' 68 which seems to eliminate "separate"
creditors. "Community claims" under the act, however, are those "that
arose before the commencement of the case concerning the debtor for
which property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) . . . is liable." 69
Section 541(a)(2) provides that the bankrupt's estate is comprised of "[aill
interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property
as of the commencement of the case that is . . . under the sole, equal,
or joint management and control of the debtor." In Louisiana, however,
community property is by operation of law under the joint management
63. See Holtkamp v. Littlefield, 669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); Honosky v. Honosky,
6 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
64. 712 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1983).
65. LA. C1v. CODE art. 2345.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(C) (1982).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 101(6) (1982).
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and control of either spouse, including "the debtor." 7 It follows that
the claims of the sepatate creditors of a nonbankrupt spouse are "com-
munity claims," and that the separate creditors are, therefore, "creditors"
entitled to allowance of their claims against that property in the bankruptcy
of the spouse.
Coowners
In First National Bank v. Crawford,' the plaintiff bank appealed
the dismissal of its suit on a promissory note for failure to amend and
join two co-makers on the note previously determined to be necessary
parties. The bank had not joined the co-makers because they were in
bankruptcy. The promissory note held by the bank was executed by defen-
dant Crawford, her daughter and son-in-law, the Howes, and secured by
a mortgage on immovable property owned in indivision by Mrs. Howe
and her mother Mrs. Crawford. The Howes operated a dairy farm on
land which included the mortgaged tract. The dairy farm was subject to
an order for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act containing
an injunction and stay order. The second circuit held that the action on
the debt, insofar as it related to the Howes and the property securing
the note, was precluded by the preemptive exercise of jurisdiction and
the stay order of the bankruptcy court. Although the Howes were necessary
parties to the suit on the note, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
necessary parties not subject to the jurisdiction of the court need not be
joined. 2 The appeal court therefore reversed the trial court's dismissal
of the bank's case.
The decison is consistent with the purpose of section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Act in that it prevents the creditors, stayed from action against
the debtor and his assets in federal court, from obtaining judgment against
the debtor's property in state court.
Since in this case, one of the bankrupts was personally liable to the
bank, making the bank a "creditor," it could file a claim in the bankruptcy
court and reach the mortgaged land there. The outcome is similar to the
case of community property discussed above.
Suppose, however, that the bankrupts had undertaken no liability to
the bank. The definition of creditor includes an "entity that has a claim
against the debtor."7 3 Since only creditors can file claims, it might ap-
pear that the bank has no access to its collateral once the collateral is
under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. It is possible that, in such
circumstances, a court could find the bank to be a creditor, primarily
70. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346.
71. 426 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
72. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 642.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1982).
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because the act's definition of claim is both expansive and vague.7 4
However, there is another route as well. Anyone who is a "party in in-
terest" may move the bankruptcy court either to compel the trustee to
provide "adequate protection" or for relief from the automatic stay."5
Once the stay is lifted, of course, the bank could proceed to foreclose
on the land just as if the bankruptcy had never occurred.
Suppose, however, that after the bank obtains judgment against Mrs.
Howe, it can levy on her other assets sufficient to discharge the note.
Not having signed on a nonrecourse basis, she is probably fairly called
upon to pay. However, the mortgage would likewise be extinguished by
that payment. While the co-debtor may have contracted to pay, it is less
clear that she intended to provide the other creditors of the Howes a wind-
fall in the bankruptcy-the value of the now unencumbered land being
available to pay their claims. Unless Mrs. Crawford, by having paid the
bank's claim, can become subrogated to its position and file her own
claim as a secured creditor, that outcome is potentially possible.76 Fur-
thermore, unlike the community property situation, what the coowner of
property liable for the debts of a bankrupt loses may also be a loss to
the coowner's separate creditors, who have no means of appearing in the
bankruptcy themselves.
The cases decided last year, and their possible variants discussed above,
illustrate both the questions of statutory technique and bankruptcy policy
which must influence the decision on how to disentangle the debtor from
others interested in his affairs. First, it is clear that Congress intended
the bankruptcy court to partition the interests in any property owned,
even in part, by the debtor. The expansive definition of what property
belongs in the debtor's estate,77 and the breadth of operation of the
automatic stay provisions in section 362 permit no other conclusion. It
should follow that coowners of the property, who may not be, on the
date of the bankruptcy petiton, what we would commonly refer to as
creditors should be given some standing to appear in the proceedings in
which their assets are liquidated and divided. The Bankruptcy Act cur-
rently contemplates two possible techniques for such an appearance. The
coowner can be deemed a creditor, and perhaps to the extent of his in-
terest in the property even a secured creditor," and the partition of the
property and payment to the coowner handled in the administration of
the bankrupt's affairs. Alternatively, the coowner can appear in the
74. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). Since all rights are deemed claims, the definition is more
expansive than the term itself would imply.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 509 (1982).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982).
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bankruptcy and request "adequate protection""9 from the trustee, or in
lieu thereof, relief from the automatic stay, after which whatever disen-
tangling is needed can take place in state court outside bankruptcy. The
grounds for relief from the stay ("cause")"0 or the determination of just
what "adequate protection" is, however, will remain fluid concepts until
a great deal of case-by-case development occurs with their meaning.
Relief from the stay, of course, means that the problems of coowner-
ship must be worked out first with a permission-granting proceeding in
bankruptcy, and later with a proceeding somewhere else. Louisiana secured
creditors, alone among creditors in the fifty states8' in their lack of author-
ity to liquidate their collateral in the market without first going through
a sheriff's auction, may prefer to have the trustee sell the collateral for
them, even for a fee, rather than simply gain permission to conduct a
second, expensive, state court foreclosure proceeding afterwards. Coowners,
as well, have reason to prefer untangling in bankruptcy, so long as their
rights there are adequately protected.
Second, the principle is emerging that simple co-debtors can be treated
separately: the bankruptcy of one leaves the other where he contracted
to be (or in the case of a tortfeasor, where the law put him). If there
are claims among co-debtors, for example, for indemnity or contribution,
those claims make the co-debtors "creditors" of the bankrupt. Accord-
ingly, those claims should be handled in the bankruptcy. It would be
economical to determine the co-debtor's liability and his claim against
the bankrupt in one proceeding. The only justification for not having that
proceeding occur in the bankruptcy process is the exhaustion (at the end
of the Marathon) of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Once that
jurisdiction is resuscitated, it may be appropriate to take a new look at
whether bankruptcy stays ought, indeed, apply to claims against co-debtors.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
81. All other states, for example, have adopted article 9 of the UCC which, under
section 9-503, authorizes creditors to repossess collateral without judicial process.
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